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will have on the other policymaker's policies in the future. This discussion suggests a formulation of decentralized policymaking as a dynamic game.
In this paper we present such a game-theoretic framework. The decision environment is described by a set of linear difference equations with additive disturbances. Each player is assumed to behave as if he minimizes the expected value of a preference (loss) function which is approximated by a quadratic fullction. 4 The objective functions are in general different for each player.
In making his decision each player has certain expectations as to what the other players will do. In this paper we study equilibrium solutions, and leave problems of stability aside. ' We assume that no coalitions are formed, and we shall first study noncooperative solutions (also called Nash equilibria). The equilibrium solution is such that, given the decisions of the other players, no player has any incentive to change his decision rule (or regret having chosen it). We might say that the players are assumed to have rational expectations in the sense that the expectation of the others' actions turn out to be the actual outcome. 6 However, in dynamic games there turn out to be more than one possible solution concept which give different solutions, even in the absence of uncertainty. A central topic of this paper is therefore the evaluation of open loop and feedback solutions as possible candidates for an equilibrium solution.
In Section 2 we present the noncooperative feedback solution to an n-person dynamic game. We also comment on how the open loop solution could be computed. In Section 3 open loop and feedback solutions are compared, and we try to give an understanding of why they are different.
Casual observation of macroeconomic policymaking in the U.S. indicates that the assumption of noncooperative solution is not necessarily the one that describes reality best. It seems that the Congress with certain intervals will announce its tax and spending policy. Given that, the Federal Reserve Board will try to meet its objectives by adjusting its monetary instruments. We might say that the Congress is a dominant player who announces his decision first, 4 Admittedly our assumptions are such that uncertainty will play only a minor role. We shall be able to use the well known certainty equivalence property (cf. Simon [26] or Theil [29] ) and compute the relevant decision rules from a problem where the stochastic variables are replaced by their mean values. However, the implications of uncertainty will be pointed out wherever necessary, and even when included in such a simple manner, the presence uncertainty may still lead to key results, as can be seen for instance in [15] . 5 By stability we refer to the property that under reasonable assumptions the decision rules will move towards the equilibrium decision rules if the system is subject to shocks, or if the players initially have incomplete information about how the system works. By contrast, the literature on the assignment problem, which also deals with decentralized policymaking, although not from an optimization point of view, is mainly concerned with the stability problem. The so-called principle of effective market classification states that each policy instrument should be directed towards that target on which it has relatively the greatest impact. Mundell, who first posed the problem [18] , has stated that the principle of effective market classification is basically a mathematical proposition which implies that, instead of letting each institution deal with several problems (or goals), responsibilities should be allocated to various authorities in such a way as to ensure stability of the system (see [7, (129 while the other player (the Fed) decides what his optimal decision is, taking the decision of the dominant player as given. In making his decision, the dominant player takes into account the reaction functions of the nondominant players. In equilibrium he correctly foresees these functions. In the case where there is more than one nondominant player, these are assumed to behave nonm cooperatively among themselves. The feedback solution for this case is given in Section 4. We point outt that the open loop solution is likely lo fail as anl. equilibrium concept.
The dominant player solution is a special case of a much more general solution concept into which almost any kind of hierarchical structure can be incorporated. We indicate how our results can be generalized in that direction.
A few short remarks on the infinite horizon problem are made in Section 5. The final section offers some concluding comments, in particular with regard to economic applications.
NONCOOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS IN DISCRETE DYNAMIC GAMES7
To simplify notation we shall assume, with little loss of generality, that each of the n players has control over one instrument only. More general cases can be taken care of in our model by specifying the same preference function for more than one player.
In the following x, will be an n-dimensional vector, .y is m-dimensional, and the remaining dimensions will be obvious. Define In making his decision, player i knows that it will affect the state variables. A change in the state variables will change the other players' decisions in the future. This change in the other players' decisions will have an effect on future losses for player i. This fact is taken into account in the feedback solution when player i makes his decision. Both approaches may be said to represent noncooperative solutions in some sense. However, the feature described above seems to lend more realism to the feedback solution as an equilibrium concept. It seems reasonable in many models to assume that each decision maker will determine the effect of his decision on the state variables and consider how other players will react in the future. For instance, in an oligopolistic industry each firm may take into consideration the effect of its decision on market shares and assume that the other players will react in certain ways to different sizes of the market shares. This seems particularly reasonable if we think in terms of stability, that is, view the equilibrium solution as the end result of a process with all the players groping for decision rules that are such that, given the others' actions, nobody has any incentive to change the rule, and where forecasting errors are corrected as the players learn more about the other players' behavior.
DOMINANT PLAYER SOLUTIONS
In this section we assume that one player, say player ii, is dominant in the sense that he may announce his decision first, thereby taking into account the effect of his decision upon the other players' decisions. When he has announced his decision, the other players behave noncooperatively with the decision of the dominant player as given.
We shall outline the computations of the feedback solution. The open loop solution will then be obvious. As in Section 2 we assume that the problems for the n players are such that the first-order conditions will determine both necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimum, and that the resulting decision functions are unique.
The problems of the n -1 nondominant players are as described in Section 2. There are n -1 first-order conditions as in (2.3), and given the decision of player n, we get a unique noncooperative solution at time t of the form Assume again that Ylo = Y2o = .1. Then the solution is xll .1581, x21 = .2479, x12 = .0223, and x22 = .0690. However, if the problem is resolved after the first period, it turns out that the solution for the second period is x12 = .0286 and x22 = .0500, which for both players gives a higher value of the objective function for the last period than the original plan. 14 In dominant player games we can also distinguish between closed loop and feedback solutions (see [25] ). The closed loop solution is of feedback type but, the dominant player is assumed to announce his decisions for all periods at the start of the horizon. Like the open loop solution the closed loop solution is inconsistent under replanning. only two levels of dominance, and one player on the highest level.
SOME REMARKS ON INFINITE HORIZON GAMES
The computational methods for finding the infinite period stationary feedback solutions by successive approximations would be similar to the methods outlined in Sections 2 and 4. It would take us too far to go into existence and convergence problems in this paper.15 Suffice it here to say that for most problems convergence has turned out to be quite rapid. These stationary decision rules will be solutions to a set of interrelated functional equations, one for each player. Similarly, by letting T go to infinity in the open loop formulation, the first-period decision rule will converge to a stationary rule which in general will be different from the feedback stationary solution. The point we want to make is that for infinite horizon models we will discard the open loop solution as unsuitable for an equilibrium concept also for the noncooperative model However, since Xy* will be symmetric, we need to solve only m(m -1)/2 equations in the same number of unknowns to find ryes 15 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have been concerned with finding suitable equilibrium solutions for noncooperative and dominant player dynamic games. For that purpose we have compared open loop and feedback solutions, which in general are different, even in the absence of uncertainty. We argue that the feedback solution is generally more appropriate as an equilibrium concept. In the dominant player case the feedback solution is such that the plans of all the players are continually optimal throughout the horizon, while the open loop solution is inconsistent under replanning.
The potential applications of the results in this paper appear to be numerous. The introduction indicates that we originally had decentralized macroeconomic policymaking in mind. An application to a problem of that type was presented in Kydland [14] . In Kydland and Prescott [15] the problem of finding optimal stabilization policies for a competitive economy was formulated as a dominant player dynamic stochastic game. The policymaker is the dominant player, taking into account the reaction functions of economic agents. The results were found to have important implications for econometric policy evaluation.
A traditional application of game theory in. economics has been oligopoly theory. In [13] we formulated a dynamic model for an oligopolistic industry ill the framework of this paper. The initial results were sufficiently promising to lead one to believe that dynamic game-theoretic models may provide new ilnsights into empirical phenomena in the area of industrial organization.
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